Conservator Allowed Wide Latitude in Acting for Incompetent in Divorce Action by unknown
CONSERVATOR ALLOWED WIDE LATITUDE IN ACTING
FOR INCOMPETENT IN DIVORCE ACTION
Newman v. Newman
42 I1. App. 2d 203, 191 N.E.2d 614 (1963)
A husband brought suit for divorce charging his wife with extreme
and repeated cruelty. The divorce decree incorporated provisions of an
earlier property settlement agreement between the parties. At no time
during the divorce proceedings was there raised any question with respect
to the wife's mental capacity. Yet less than four months after the divorce
decree was entered the wife was adjudged an incompetent and a conserv-
ator was appointed by the probate court. A little over a year from the
date of the divorce decree, the wife's conservator requested and was given
leave to appear for the wife and present her petition asking that the divorce
decree be vacated.'
The wife's petition alleged that by reason of her mental incapacity
she was incapable of exercising sufficient judgment to consent to the
divorce decree and was thereby deprived of the opportunity of defending
the suit. The wife's petition alleged that since she was mentally disabled
she was not guilty of the acts of cruelty charged as grounds for the
divorce.2 The husband's answer alleged that at all times relevant to the
divorce the wife had been competent. The conservator thereafter filed an-
other petition with the circuit court, wherein he stated that due to the un-
certainties and expense of the pending litigation, and in accord with an
order of the probate court advising it, he proposed to accept a settlement
offered by the husband. The circuit court then entered an order modifying
the original decree in accordance with the settlement offered by the hus-
band and approved by the conservator.
A year and a half later, on June 12, 1962, the wife filed a new pe-
tition alleging that she had had her civil rights restored and was no longer
institutionalized. She prayed that the divorce decree be further modified
to require the husband to pay her an increased sum per week. The hus-
band denied the jurisdiction of the court on the ground that the divorce
decree provided for a property settlement in lieu of alimony. The trial
court held that the modifying order by the circuit court of the original
decree was of no effect. The trial court further held that since the original
decree provided for alimony, it was possible to modify the agreement. The
trial court then awarded the wife an increased sum per month as permanent
alimony.
1 The divorce decree was entered on February 6, 1959. The wife's conservator
was given leave to appear for her and present her petition on March 1, 1960.
2 The wife's petition noted various instances of hospitalization and psychiatric
treatment extending over the period from January 1955 to February 1959, and re-
ferred to suicide attempts and insulin shock treaments administered. Newman v.
Newman, 42 Ill. App. 2d 203, 191 N.E.2d 614 (1963).
RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
The husband appealed to the Appellate Court of Illinois and that
court reversed the trial court. The appellate court, one judge dissenting,
held that the order of the circuit court was immune from collateral attack.
The court further held that the settlement entered into by the conservator
was a property settlement in lieu of alimony and as such barred the wife
from asserting any right to alimony. The court held that the conservator
had authority pursuant to the order of the probate court to set aside the
divorce. Having authority to attempt to set aside the divorce decree,
the conservator had authority as well to enter into the settlement that modi-
fied the divorce decree. Finding the first modification order of the circuit
court binding, the appellate court held that the restoration to the wife of
her civil rights did not permit her to lay claim to any right that she had
effectively waived through the action of her conservator.
3
It is difficult to see how the court could reach the decision it did upon
the facts of the case. The agreement originally made by the parties prior
to the divorce proceedings, and later incorporated into the divorce decree,
was termed by the parties a property settlement agreement. This agree-
ment provided a release by the defendant whereby the defendant agreed to
relinquish all claims whatsoever upon the husband for alimony, support, and
maintenance, under the laws of the State of Illinois except as provided in
the property agreement itself. The divorce decree, having adopted the
property settlement agreement, provided that the parties were barred
from ever asserting any rights of dower, curtesy, or alimony against each
other.
4
The appellate court in its opinion makes reference to the modification
of the original decree, saying that "the modification of decree order of
November 28, 1960, set forth and again approves a property settlement
in lieu of alimony, and defendant does not contend otherwise." 5
Although the language of the appellate court speaks of the original
decree as being one of a property settlement in lieu of alimony, such an
interpretation by the appellate court would render its decision inherently
inconsistent. If the original decree contained a property settlement in
lieu of alimony, the trial court could not, under the Illinois statute, have
entered any modification of its original decree.6
3 Newman v. Newman, supra note 2.
4 The language of the original agreement stated: "That the parties hereto are
forever barred from asserting any rights to dower, curtesy, or alimony against each
other, except as provided in the said property agreement...."
The language of the original decree declared that: "The Wife hereby: (a)
relinquishes all claims whatsoever for alimony, support and maintenance ...except
the right to demand performance of all the undertakings of the Husband contained
in this agreement. . .
5 Newman v. Newman, supra note 2.
6 Ill. Rev. Stat. ch. 40, § 19 (1961). This statute provides:
Irrespective of whether the court has or has not in its decree made an
order for the payment of alimony or support, it may at any time after
entry of a decree . . . make such order for the payment of alimony and
maintenance of the spouse ...as, from the evidence and nature of the case,
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That the original decree did in fact contain a provision for alimony
seems clear. The original agreement provided that the wife was to receive
specified weekly sums of money for support to be terminable at the end of
102 weeks or the wife's death or remarriage.
When a divorce decree provides for payments to be paid for an in-
definite period of time, the decree is one for ordinary alimony and not a
lump sum in lieu of alimony.7 The payments to the defendant were un-
certain as to sum and period of time since they depended upon her remain-
ing alive and not remarrying. Thus the original agreement provided for
ordinary alimony and could have been altered by the court in the instant
case.
8
The agreement, as noted earlier, contained as well a waiver of alimony
by the defendant except as provided in the agreement. However, such
waivers have been ignored by the courts where an award is made con-
tingent upon the death or remarriage of one of the parties.9
Assuming the position of the appellate court to be that the original
decree was for ordinary alimony, their only consistent position would be
that the circuit court in modifying the original decree converted the earlier
award of alimony into a lump sum property settlement in lieu of alimony.
The agreement contained in the modification order of the circuit court
probably was a property settlement in lieu of alimony. In this agreement
the plaintiff made the award a charge upon his estate in the event of his
death prior to full payment, and not subject to defeasance by reason of the
death or remarriage of either himself or his wife.10
shall be fit, reasonable and just, but no such order subsequent to the decree
may be made in any case in which the decree recited that there has been
an express waiver of alimony or a money or property settlement in lieu
of alimony or where the court in its decree has denied alimony.
7 Adler v. Adler, 373 Ill. 361, 26 N.E. 504 (1940); Walters v. Walters, 341
Ill. App. 561, 94 N.E.2d 726 (1950); 2A Nelson, Divorce and Annulment § 17.06,
at 48 (2d ed. 1961). In Walters v. Walters, the court states that alimony is for an
indefinite period of time and usually for an indefinite total sum, whereas a property
settlement is always for a definite length of time and a sum certain.
8 Adler v. Adler, supra note 7.
9 Loeb v. Gendel, 29 Ill. App. 2d 155, 172 N.E2d 408 (1962) (dictum). In
Loeb the decree provided that it was expressly understood that the payment con-
stituted a lump sum settlement in lieu of alimony. However, the court held that this
language did not provide for a lump sum where the payments were not of a sum
certain.
10 The language in the modification order to the original decree cleared up the
earlier problem of the agreement not being for a sum certain as it provided that:
Payments herein shall be made to the Conservator of the estate of the
said Incompetent Defendant until such time as the said incompetence is re-
moved, in which event he shall make balance of payments directly to her, and
the said sum . . . shall not be subject to defeasance by reason of the death
or remarriage of either plaintiff or defendant and shall be a charge against
the estate of the plaintiff in the event of his death prior to the full satis-
faction thereof.
[Vol. 25
RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
Having established that the modification order contained a property
settlement, the question arises as to whether the circuit court had author-
ity to modify the decree. When the original divorce decree became final,
the wife's only way of attacking the decree was to petition through her
conservator that the decree be vacated under Section 72 of the Civil Practice
Act on the ground that she was mentally disturbed at the time the decree
was entered. The wife's sole prayer in her petition was that the divorce
decree be vacated.
Though Section 72 of the Civil Practice Act does not affirmatively
so state, it is quite probable that the only relief that could have been
given the wife under the statute would have been setting aside the divorce
decree. Section 72 is a codification of the common law writ of error coram
nobis. Although the writ of error coram nobis, as such, was expressly
abolished by section 72 the essentials of the common law coram nobis have
been retained in proceedings brought under the statute. Under the writ
of error coram nobis, the only relief which could be granted was the setting
aside of a judgment and the granting of a new trial."
The history of the writ of error coram nobis suggests that were the
circuit court to have first conducted a hearing on the question of the
validity of the divorce itself, there would have still been strong doubt as to
the circuit court's jurisdiction to reach the question of the original prop-
erty agreement. However no such hearing was conducted. The circuit
court dismissed the issues presented in the petition and ordered a modifica-
tion of the decree on the theory proposed by the husband and accepted by
the conservator, that the controversy over the validity of the decree would
be protracted and expensive to both parties and fraught with difficulties.
Under the wife's petition nothing was before the court except the question
of the validity of the decree. The petition did not ask for a modification
of the property agreement; it could not. Yet as noted by the dissent,
the settlement was "a complete abdication of the defendant's position and,
in effect, withdrawal of defendant's petition-the basic pleading of the
case." 12 That the court had the power to reach the property agreement
under any circumstances is doubtful. Assuming, however, that one of
the parties was mentally incompetent, the action of the circuit court
was even more censurable.
The last question raised by the Newman case involves the power of
a conservator to act for an incompetent. The powers of a conservator are
governed by statute, and no express authorization can be found in the stat-
ute empowering a conservator to waive alimony and enter into a property
settlement. 13 The power exercised by the conservator and approved by
11 People ex rel. Waite v. Bristow, 391 Ill. 101, 62 N.E.2d 545 (1945). Vol.
30A Am. Jur. Judgments § 740 (1958) states: "The merits of the original controversy
are not in issue in coram nobis proceedings. In this connection, it has been held that
the writ will not reach matters actually determined in the original proceedings. ..
12 Newman v. Newman, supra note 2, at 208, 191 N.E.2d at 618.
13 I1. Rev. Stat. ch. 3 § 215 (1961):
By leave of court without notice or upon such notice as the court
directs an executor, administrator, guardian or conservator may compound
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the appellate court, that of dropping the prayer to vacate, even transcends
that of waiving an incompetent's right to alimony. In his exercise of
power the conservator effectively paralleled an action whereby he could
bring suit for divorce in the name of an incompetent, an action con-
travening public policy favoring the stability of marriage and clearly beyond
a conservator's power.' 4
Acting on strong evidence of fraud in the divorce decree, the con-
servator filed a petition seeking to vacate that decree. No mention was
made in the petition of a modification of the earlier property agreement.
What, then, did the proposed settlement accepted by the conservator pur-
port to settle? Even assuming the doubtful contention of the appellate
court that the circuit court had jurisdiction to consider a modification
of the property agreement, the only way the ciruit court could have modi-
fied the decree would have to have been premised upon the court first find-
ing that the wife's prayer was unsupportable by the evidence. Only by
denying to the wife her prayer that the divorce decree should be vacated
could the court then modify the existing decree. Yet without such a
determination the conservator accepted a settlement that settled little except
that the defendant had abdicated her right to preserve her marriage.
The appellate court states that if the action of a conservator can be
shown to be beneficial to the welfare of a ward, courts have permitted such
rights to be exercised on behalf of the ward. The settlement that modified
the original decree was not beneficial to the wife. By its terms the settle-
ment precluded any future readjustment as would exist in ordinary ali-
mony awards.15
Had the conservator consciously set out to work against the wife, he
could not have acted more against her interests. Had the wife been suc-
cessful in her suit to vacate the divorce decree she would have been in a
better position than after the settlement. Had she not prevailed in her
action she would still have had alimony and would have been in a better
position than after the settlement. The wife's conservator effectively
destroyed her past and future rights without materially bettering her
financial position, and it is difficult to see how he could have the power to
act so detrimentally to her interests.
or compromise any claim or interest of the ward or the decedent in any
personal estate or exchange any claim or any interest in personal estate for
other claims or personal estate upon such terms as the court directs.
14 Ill. Rev. Stat. ch 40, § 19 (1961).
15 In accepting a settlement the conservator barred the wife from seeking
to set aside the divorce decree and in effect made the decree binding much the same
as if he had sued for the divorce for the wife.
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